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Abstract 
 
Economic theory traditionally suggests that monetary policy can influence the 
business cycle, but not the long-run potential output. Despite well documented theoretical and 
empirical consensus on money neutrality in the literature, the role of money as an 
informational variable for monetary policy decision has remained opened to debate with 
empirical works providing mixed outcomes. This paper addresses two substantial challenges 
to this debate: the neglect of developing countries in the literature and the use of new financial 
dynamic fundamentals that broadly reflect monetary policy. The empirics are based on annual 
data from 34 African countries for the period 1980 to 2010. Using a battery of tests for 
integration and long-run equilibrium properties, results offer overall support for the traditional 
economic theory.  
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1. Introduction 
Economic theory traditionally suggests that monetary policy can influence the 
business cycle, but not the long-run potential output (Nogueira, 2009). Put in other words, 
monetary policy is neutral in the long-run. Evidence of this neutrality has been substantially 
documented in the literature (Olekalns, 1996; Sarletis & Koustas, 1998; Bernanke & Mihov, 
1998; Bullard, 1999; Bae et al., 2005; Nogueira, 2009). Despite theoretical and empirical 
consensus on money neutrality (Lucas, 1980; Gerlach & Svensson, 2003), the role of money 
as an informational variable for monetary policy decision has remained opened to debate 
(Roffia & Zaghini, 2008; Nogueira, 2009; Bhaduri & Durai, 2012). Accordingly, empirical 
studies provide mixed outcomes and findings are contingent on selected countries and 
historical periods under consideration (Stock & Watson, 1999; Dwyer & Hafer, 1999; 
Trecroci & Vega-Croissier, 2000; Leeper & Roush, 2002; Bae et al., 2005
2
; Assoumou-Ella, 
2012; Mezui-Mbeng, 2013; Nguena & Tsafack, 2014).  
In light of above debate, two challenges are central in the literature (Nogueira, 2009). 
Firstly, but for a few exceptions (Moosa, 1997; Bae & Ratti, 2000; Starr, 2005; Nogueira, 
2009), the literature on the long-run money neutrality has focused on developed countries for 
the most part. Evidence provided by these studies may not be relevant for developing 
countries because the financial dynamics of monetary policy may not be the same. For 
instance, financial depth (liabilities) in the perspective of money supply is not similar in 
developing countries because a great chunk of the monetary base does not transit through the 
banking sector.  Moreover, Weeks (2010) has recently postulated that the standard approach 
of monetary policy in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is absurdly inappropriate since the vast 
majority of governments in SSA lack the instruments to make monetary policy effective
3
. 
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 The case of  Sweden in the sample that does not confirm the consensus of long-run money neutrality.  
3
 Weeks has asserted that SSA lacks two main channels for implementing monetary policy: (1) seeking to 
influence the borrowing rates for private sector by adjusting the interest rate at which commercial banks can 
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Secondly, the empirical investigation focusing on monetary aggregates has not taken into 
account all financial dynamic fundamentals of monetary policy identified by the Financial 
Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank. For example, other 
financial dynamics of efficiency (at banking and financial system levels), activity (from 
banking and financial system perspectives), and size (credit of the banking sector in relation 
to that of the financial system) substantially affect the velocity of money and hence, the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. The employment of these financial fundamentals is further 
justified by the substantially documented surplus liquidity issues in developing countries. 
Accordingly, financial allocation efficiency is a serious concern in developing countries 
(especially in African financial institutions) because of surplus liquidity (Saxegaard, 2006) 
and limited financial activity (credit). 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is therefore twofold. On the one hand, it 
assesses the long-run neutrality of monetary policy in a continent (Africa) that has not 
received the much needed scholarly focus. On the other hand, it employs new financial 
dynamics that broadly reflect the level of money supply.  The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 highlights the intuition for the empirics, presents the data and discusses the 
methodology. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
   
2. Intuition, Data and Methodology  
2.1 Intuition for the empirics 
  While there is vast empirical work on the long-run monetary policy neutrality based 
on aggregate measures of money supply, there is yet (as far as we have reviewed) no 
employment of fundamental financial dynamics (that reflect the quantity of money supply) in 
the assessment of the neutrality theory.  To this end, we are aware of the risks of “doing 
measurement without past empirical basis” and assert that reporting facts even in the absence 
                                                                                                                                                        
borrow from the central bank or; (2) trying to influence the creation of private credit through so-called open 
market operations.  
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of past supporting studies in the context of an outstanding theoretical model is a useful 
scientific activity. Beside this fact, applied econometrics has other tasks than the mere 
validation or refutation of economic theories with existing exposition and prior analytical 
frameworks (Asongu, 2014ab). Hence, we provide the economic intuition motivating the use 
of a plethora of financial measures in the assessment of the long-run neutrality of monetary 
policy. Accordingly, money supply can be understood in terms of financial depth, financial 
allocation efficiency, financial activity and financial size. (1) Financial intermediary depth 
could be seen both from an overall economic perspective and a financial system standpoint. 
This distinction, as will be detailed in the data section is worth pointing out because, unlike 
the developed world, in developing countries a great chunk of the monetary base does not 
transit through the banking sector. (2) Financial allocation efficiency (at banking and financial 
system levels) that reflects the fulfillment of the fundamental role of banks (in transforming 
mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators) could also intuitively be conceived as 
the ability of banks to increase the velocity of money. (3) Financial activity (from banking 
and financial system angles) reflects the ability of banks to grant credit to economic operators. 
(4) Financial size (deposit bank assets/total assets) reflects the credit allocated by banking 
institutions as a proportion of total assets in the financial system (deposit bank assets plus 
central bank assets). It follows that financial dynamic fundamentals are exogenous to money 
supply and hence, monetary policy.  
In accordance with the stance of Weeks (2010) on the inherent ineffectiveness of 
monetary policy in African countries discussed above, the insights from the ‘Blinder credit-
rationing model’ are useful in providing more justification for the empirics.  Consistent with 
Blinder (1987), a rethinking new monetary policy dynamics is needed at times: “The reader 
should understand that this is merely an expositional device. I would not wish to deny that the 
interest elasticity and expectational error mechanisms have some validity. But the spirit of 
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this paper is that those mechanisms do not seem important enough to explain the deep 
recessions that are apparently caused by central bank policy” (p. 2). The postulation of 
Blinder is even more relevant when existing monetary and exchange rate responses have not 
been effective at offsetting output shocks in Africa owing to the substantially documented 
surplus liquidity issues (Saxegaard, 2006). 
The choice of the monetary policy variables is in line with the empirical underpinnings 
of recent African monetary literature targeting inflation and real GDP output (Asongu, 
2014ab). These financial dynamic fundamentals are consistent with all the dimensions 
identified by the FDSD of the World Bank. Moreover, we are not the first to think out of the 
box when it comes to the empirics of monetary policy. Blinder (1987) in examining the 
effects of monetary policy on economic activity completely banished interest rate elasticities: 
“In order to make credit rationing mechanism stand out in bold relief, most other channels of 
monetary policy (such as interest elasticities and expectational errors) are banished from the 
model” (p. 2).  
  
2.2 Data 
 We examine a panel of 34 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) and the FDSD of the World Bank (WB) for the period 1980-2010. Our 
restriction to only thirty-four countries in the continent is due to constraints in data 
availability. Summary statistics (with presentation of countries) and correlation analysis are 
presented in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively. The descriptive statistics suggest that 
the variables are quite comparable, with the variations showing that we should be confident 
that significant estimations would emerge. The correlation analysis presents justifications for 
our usage of alternative indicators in almost every financial intermediary dynamic for 
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robustness purposes
4
. Definitions of the variables as well as their corresponding sources are 
presented in Appendix 3.  
Consistent with the literature (Nogueira, 2009), output is measured in terms of real 
GDP. For clarity in organization, the monetary variables are presented in terms of money 
(financial depth), credit (financial activity), efficiency (of allocation) and size.  Firstly, from a 
money standpoint, we are consistent with the FDSD and recent African development literature 
(Asongu, 2014bc, 2013c) in measuring financial depth both from overall-economic and 
financial system perspectives with indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial 
system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. While the former denotes the monetary base plus 
demand, saving and time deposits, the latter represents liquid liabilities of the financial 
system. It is interesting to distinguish between these two measures because, since we are 
dealing exclusively with African countries a great chunk of the monetary base does not transit 
via the banking sector.  Secondly, financial intermediary activity is measured in terms credit. 
Hence, the paper seeks to point out the ability of banks to grant credit to economic operators.  
We measure both banking-system-activity and financial-system-activity with “private 
domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb” and “private credit by domestic banks and other 
financial institutions: Pcrbof” respectively. Thirdly, financial efficiency5 measures the ability 
of deposits (money) to be transformed into credit (financial activity) for economic operators. 
We adopt indicators of banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-efficiency 
(respectively ‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on financial 
system deposits: Fcfd’). Fourthly, financial size is measured in terms of deposit bank assets as 
a proportion of total assets (deposit bank assets plus central bank assets).  
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  For instance, in the financial depth measurement, money supply is highly correlated with liquid liabilities. This 
analogy can be extended to financial efficiency and financial activity in which we have employed both banking 
and financial system measures that can robustly check one another.  
5
 By financial efficiency here, we neither refer to the profitability-related notion (concept) nor to the production 
efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (through Data Envelopment Analysis: DEA). 
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2.3 Methodology 
 The estimation technique typically follows mainstream literature on testing the long-
run neutrality of monetary policy (Nogueira, 2009). The approach involves unit roots and 
cointegration tests that assess the stationary properties and long-term equilibriums 
respectively.  
 
3. Empirical analysis  
3.1 Unit root tests 
 We examine stationary properties with two types of panel unit root tests. When the 
variables exhibit unit roots in levels, we proceed to investigate their stationary properties in 
first difference. Both the Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC, 2002) and Im, Pesaran & Shin (IPS, 2003) 
tests are applied. Whereas the former is a homogenous oriented panel unit root test (common 
unit root as null hypothesis), the latter is a heterogeneous based test (individual unit roots as 
null hypotheses). When the results are different, IPS (2003) takes precedence over LLC 
(2002) in decision making because, with respect to Maddala & Wu (1999), the alternative 
hypothesis of LLC (2002) is too powerful. In accordance with Liew (2004), goodness of fit 
(or optimal lag selection) is ensured by the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQC) and 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for the LLC (2002) and IPS (2003) tests respectively.  
Table 1 below reports the results of panel unit root tests. It can be observed that with 
the exception of financial system efficiency, the variables are overwhelmingly non stationary 
in levels; that is, they exhibit a unit root. This interpretation is substantially consistent for both 
tests (with homogenous and heterogeneous assumptions). These results highlight the 
possibility of cointegration (long-run equilibrium) among the variables because according to 
the Engel-Granger theorem, two variables that are not stationary may have a linear 
combination in the long-run (Engle & Granger, 1987). 
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Table 1 – Panel unit root tests 
          
  LLC tests for homogenous panel IPS tests for heterogeneous panel 
  Panel A: Financial Depth and Efficiency  
Deterministic 
components 
Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Depth Financial Efficiency 
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd 
Level c 3.135 3.963 -3.52*** -0.801 2.391 4.516 -2.53*** -1.81** 
ct 4.207 5.563 -0.415 3.555 2.997 4.944 -1.015 -2.75*** 
First 
difference 
c -12.78*** -10.88*** -16.00*** n.a -14.33*** -12.44*** -18.18*** n.a 
ct -11.63*** -10.73*** -13.97*** n.a -12.37*** -10.74*** -17.07*** n.a 
          
  Panel B: Financial Activity, Financial size and Real Output 
  Financial Activity Fin. Size Real Financial Activity Fin. Size Real 
  Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Ouput Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Output 
Level c -0.661 -0.764 3.584 5.358 1.478 0.610 2.789 9.380 
ct 3.029 3.313 2.597 0.447 2.488 2.251 1.486 -0.524 
First 
difference 
c -5.31*** -6.03*** -18.50*** -18.6*** -9.83*** -9.68*** -18.81*** -18.3*** 
ct -3.71*** -4.19*** -12.01*** -15.1*** -7.76*** -7.91*** -13.85*** -15.4*** 
          
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. 
Maximum lag is 8 and optimal lags are chosen with the HQC for LLC test and the AIC for IPS test. Optimal lag for the most part is 2. LLC: 
Levin, Lin & Chu (2002). IPS: Im, Pesaran & Shin (2003).  M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid Liabilities. BcBd: Banking System 
Efficiency. FcFd: Financial System Efficiency. Pcrb: Banking System Activity. Pcrbof: Financial System Activity. Dabcba: Financial Size. 
Fin: Financial. 
 
3.2 Cointegration tests 
 Consistent with the cointegration theory, two (or more) variables that exhibit unit roots 
in levels may have a linear combination (equilibrium) in the long-term. A distant equilibrium 
indicates permanent changes of one variable affect permanent movements in the other 
variable. To examine this long-turn relationship, we test for cointegration using both the 
Engle-Granger based Pedroni and Engle-Granger based Kao tests, which are heterogeneous 
and homogenous panel-based respectively (Camarero & Tamarit, 2002). Application of both 
heterogeneous and homogenous tests is in line with our earlier application of both types of 
tests in the assessment of unit root properties. Accordingly, in event of conflict of interests in 
the results we base our decision on Predroni (1999) because Kao (1999) has less deterministic 
assumptions
6
. The same deterministic trend assumptions employed in the IPS (2003) unit root 
tests are used in the Pedroni (1999) cointegration tests. Optimal lag selection for goodness of 
fit is by the AIC (Liew, 2004; Asongu, 2013d). The choice of bivariate statistics has a twofold 
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 Whereas Pedroni (1999) is applied in the presence of both ‘constant’ and  ‘constant and trend’, Kao (1999) is 
based only on the former (constant).  
10 
 
justification: on the one hand, it is in line with the problem statement and on the other hand, it 
mitigates misspecification issues in long-run equilibrium estimations
7
.  
 Table 2 below presents the cointegration results. No cointegration test for financial 
system efficiency and real output is carried out because the former does not exhibit a unit root 
in levels. Broadly, the results demonstrate the absence of a long-run relationship between 
monetary policy and real output in terms of GDP. Hence, financial depth (both from money 
supply and liquid liabilities perspectives), financial allocation efficiency (at banking and 
financial system levels), banking system activity and financial size do not have a long-run 
relationship with real output. It follows that, permanent changes in these financial 
intermediary dynamics (exogenous to monetary policy) do not affect permanent changes in 
real GDP output in the long-run. Hence, the long-run neutrality of money. The findings are 
broadly consistent with recent African monetary literature (Asongu, 2014d).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 –  Bivariate panel cointegration tests (Pedroni and Kao Engle-Granger based tests) 
         
 Panel A: Depth, Efficiency and Real Output 
 Financial Depth and  Output Financial Efficiency and Output 
 M2 and Output  Fdgdp and Output  BcBd and Output  FcFd and Output  
 c ct c ct c ct c ct 
 Engle-Granger based Pedroni test for heterogeneous panel 
Panel v-Statistics  -0.791 3.21*** -0.127 3.42*** -1.615 3.62*** n.a n.a 
Panel rho-Statistics 2.544 -0.067 1.832 -0.371 2.432 0.620 n.a n.a 
Panel PP-Statistics 3.391 -1.64* 2.578 -2.39*** 3.086 -0.667 n.a n.a 
Panel ADF-Statistics 2.941 -2.95*** 2.209 -3.72*** 2.058 -2.02** n.a n.a 
         
Group rho-Statistics 3.974 2.215 3.463 1.985 4.521 2.808 n.a n.a 
Group PP-Statistics 4.930 -0.377 4.124 -1.198 5.531 0.904 n.a n.a 
Group ADF-Statistics 3.822 -3.11*** 3.164 -4.51*** 4.218 -2.48*** n.a n.a 
         
 Engle-Granger based Kao test for homogenous panel 
-ADF t statistics 0.716 n.a -0.084 n.a 0.541 n.a n.a n.a 
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 For instance, multivariate cointegration may involve variables that are stationary in levels (See Gries et al., 
2009).  
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 Panel B: Activity, Size and Real Output 
 Financial Activity and Output Financial Size and Output 
 Pcrb and Output  Pcrbof and Output  Dbacba and Output   
 c ct c ct c ct   
 Engle-Granger based Pedroni test for heterogeneous panel   
Panel v-Statistics  -1.045 3.64*** -0.831 3.99*** -1.288 6.04***   
Panel rho-Statistics 3.046 0.154 2.843 0.207 1.200 -0.260   
Panel PP-Statistics 4.387 -1.554* 4.117 -1.66** 0.865 -1.75**   
Panel ADF-Statistics 2.323 -3.70*** 2.152 -3.07*** 0.376 -5.64***   
         
Group rho-Statistics 4.606 2.567 4.371 2.579 2.433 1.887   
Group PP-Statistics 6.245 -0.160 5.941 -0.647 1.377 -1.268   
Group ADF-Statistics 2.225 -3.76*** 2.240 -3.41*** 0.732 -6.55***   
         
 Engle-Granger based Kao test for homogenous panel   
 1.309* n.a 1.135 n.a -0.707 n.a   
         
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. M2: 
Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid Liabilities. BcBd: Banking System Efficiency. FcFd: Financial System Efficiency. Pcrb: Banking System 
Activity. Pcrbof: Financial System Activity. Dabcba: Financial Size. PP: Phillips-Peron. ADF: Augmented Dickey Fuller. No deterministic 
trend assumption. Maximum lags is 8 and optimal lags are chosen via  AIC. Optimal lags for the most part is 1, with exceptions of tests for 
financial system efficiency and financial system activity where 3 and 2 lags are used respectively.  
 
 
3.3 Robustness checks 
 In order to ensure that our results are robust, the following checks and observations 
have been carried out.  (1) With the exception of financial size, for every financial dynamic 
(money, efficiency or credit) two indicators have been employed. Thus, the findings have 
overwhelmingly encapsulated measures of banking and financial systems.  (2) Both 
homogenous and heterogeneous assumptions have been considered in the unit root and 
cointegration tests. (3) Optimal lag selection for goodness of fit in the specification of the 
models has been consistent with the recommendations of Liew (2004)
8
. (4) By employing 
bivariate analysis in cointegration tests, we have focused on the problem statement and 
limited cointegration misspecification issues.   
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 “The major findings in the current simulation study are previewed as follows. First, these criteria managed to 
pick up the correct lag length at least half of the time in small sample. Second, this performance increases 
substantially as sample size grows. Third, with relatively large sample (120 or more observations), HQC is 
found to outdo the rest in correctly identifying the true lag length. In contrast, AIC and FPE should be a better 
choice for smaller sample. Fourth, AIC and FPE are found to produce the least probability of under estimation 
among all criteria under study. Finally, the problem of over estimation, however, is negligible in all cases. The 
findings in this simulation study, besides providing formal groundwork supportive of the popular choice of AIC 
in previous empirical researches, may as well serve as useful guiding principles for future economic researches 
in the determination of autoregressive lag length” (Liew, 2004, p. 2).  
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4. Conclusion  
This paper has addressed two substantial challenges to this debate: the neglect of 
developing countries in the literature and the use of new financial dynamic fundamentals that 
broadly reflect monetary policy. The empirics are based on annual data from 34 African 
countries for the period 1980 to 2010. Using a battery of tests for integration and long-run 
equilibrium properties, results offer overall support for the traditional economic theory of the 
long-run neutrality of money.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 – Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries  
Panel A : Summary Statistics 
  Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser. 
        
 
 
Financial 
Dynamics  
 
Financial 
Depth  
Money Supply 0.299 0.190 0.001 1.141 938 
Liquid Liabilities  0.228 0.174 0.001 0.948 942 
Financial 
Efficiency 
Banking  System 
Efficiency 
0.856 0.517 0.070 5.411 1003 
Financial System 
Efficiency 
0.897 0.505 0.139 3.979 942 
Financial 
Activity  
Banking System Activity 0.176 0.155 0.001 0.869 937 
Financial System Activity 0.200 0.211 0.001 1.739 944 
Fin. Size Financial System Size 0.686 0.235 0.017 1.609 971 
        
Real Output   Real GDP   9.679 0.667 7.900 11.456 962 
       
Panel B : Presentation of Countries (34) 
Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Ivory Coast, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania. 
        
S.D: Standard  Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser : Observations. Fin : Financial.  
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Appendix 2 –  Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Real Output   Output Logarithm of Real GDP World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic financial depth 
(Money Supply) 
M2 Monetary Base plus demand, saving and time 
deposits (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system depth 
(Liquid liabilities) 
Fdgdp Financial system deposits (% of GDP)   World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking system allocation 
efficiency 
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system allocation 
efficiency 
FcFd Financial system credit on Financial system 
deposits  
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking system activity Pcrb Private credit by deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system activity Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system size  Dbacba Deposit bank assets / (Deposit bank assets plus 
Central bank assets) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. 
Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. WDI: World 
Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 –  Correlation Analysis  
Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Size. Real   
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Output   
1.000 0.972 -0.114 -0.075 0.743 0.627 0.403 0.472 M2 
 1.000 -0.129 -0.058 0.789 0.705 0.459 0.492 Fdgdp 
  1.000 0.897 0.358 0.298 0.242 -0.119 BcBd 
   1.000 0.449 0.507 0.269 0.005 FcFd 
    1.000 0.926 0.542 0.469 Pcrb 
     1.000 0.479 0.507 Pcrbof 
      1.000 0.266 Dbacba  
       1.000 Output 
         
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposit  (Banking Intermediary System Efficiency). FcFd: 
Financial credit on Financial deposits (Financial Intermediary System Efficiency). Pcrb: Private domestic credit (Banking Intermediary 
Activity). Pcrbof: Private credit from domestic banks and other financial institutions (Financial Intermediary Activity). Fin. Financial.  
Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Total assets (Deposit bank assets plus Central bank assets). 
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